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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRESTON ALLEN, suing for himself 
and other American Indians similarly 
situated, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
PORTER L. MERRELL, individually 
and as County Clerk, Duchesne 
County, Utah, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
Preliminary Statement 
Case No. 8589 
This is a test suit by an An1erican Indian residing 
on an Indian reservation in lTtah, suing for himself 
and other American Indians siinilarly situated, to det·e·r-
mine whether the action of a state election official in 
denying plaintiff .a right to vote be·cause of his residence 
on an Indian reservation is contrary to the Constitution 
and laws of the United States and the laws of the State 
of Utah. Also involved is the validity of so much of par. 
11, Section 20-2-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as dis-
qualifies from voting Indians who reside on. Indian 
reservations and have never acquired residence in a 
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county in Utah prior to taking up their residence on such 
reservation. Because of the importance of this question 
to the more than 3,783 American Indians residing in 
Utah and in an effort to obtain an authoritative ruling 
in advance of the last registration day prior to the gen-
eral and Presidential election of November 5, 1956, the 
original jurisdiction of this court has been invoked. At 
the present time L"tah is the only state in the United 
States which denies Indians a right to vote. This case 
presents the basic question of whether this most singular 
discrimination is contrary· to the Constitution and laws 
of the United States and the laws of Utah. Its impor-
tance transcends the borders of the State of Utah, be-
cause presumably, if under the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, Utah can exclude Indians residing 
on reservations from voting, other states could, impose 
sin1ilar restrictions upon the more than 400,000 Indians 
in the United States. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff is an American Indian born in Utah on 
Dece1nber 21, 1913, being over tw·enty-one years of age.1 
He re~ides at Altonah, Duchesne County, Ftah, on as-
signed tribal land, title to which is held by the United 
States in trust for the ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation. A.t all tin1es 1naterial to this 
suit plaintiff has resided in Utah and has resided in 
1 Since this is an original action before the court on a motion 
to dismiss and not to make permanent the alternative writ, the 
facts alleged in the petition must be taken as admitted. There 
is no dispute as to the essential facts. 
2 
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Duchesne County for mor& than four months and in the 
election precinct in which he is registered for more than 
sixty days. He is a regis,tered voter in Duchesne County, 
Utah, and except for par. 11, Section 20-2-14, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, the validity of which is drawn in ques-
tion in this suit and is alleged to interfere, under ap-
plicable Utah laws, he is qualified to vote. In the last 
general election in Utah plaintiff was qualified and did 
vote. 
Plaintiff resides within the area embraced within 
the Uintah Indian Reservation established by the Execu-
tive Order of the President dated October 3, 1861, and set 
aside by the Act of May 5, 1864, 13 Stat. 63, as a Re,serva-
tion for the Indians of Utah. Pursuant to the Act of 
June 4, 1898, 30 Stat. 429 and the Act of May 27, 1902, 
32 Stat. 245, 263, certain of said Reservation lands were 
allotted in severalty ~to individual Indians and the balance 
thereof was opened to entry and settlement under the 
public land laws and much of it has been disposed of by 
fee patents and other conveyances to non-Indians. Cer-
tain undispos,ed of portions have been restored to tribal 
use and ownership. 
In 1897 the u~,tah Legislature adopted a statute, 
which has remained unchanged by legislative action and 
is now par. 11, Section 20-2-14, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, and provides with respect to registration and 
voting: 
" ( 11) Any person living upon any Indian 
or military reservation shall not be deemed a 
resident of Utah within the meaning of this chap-
3' 
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ter, unless such person had acquired a residence 
in some county in Utah prior to taking up his 
residence upon such Indian or military reserva-
tion."2 
This statutory provision has been the subject of 
opinions by the Attorney General of Utah. In 1940 the 
then Attorney General ruled that it did not apply to res-
ervations which had been opened for entry under the 
public land laws, such as the Uintah Reservation, and 
that Indians on that reservation were to be permitted 
to vote. 3 lt was under this construction that plaintiff 
has heretofore been allowed to vote. 
Subsequently, on :March 23, 1956, the present Attor-
ney General of Urtah ruled in an opinion to the Secretary 
of State, who had inquired as to who has the responsi-
bility of providing voting facilities for Indians, that" ... 
Indians who live on the reservations are not entitled to 
vote in l 1tah and a Board of County Commissioners has 
no duty to provide them with voting facilities."4 
On September 8, 1956 plaintiff presented himself 3Jt 
the office of defendant, the County Clerk of Duchesne 
County, U~tah, who under Sections 20-6-3 to 20-6-9 has 
responsibilities as an election official of the State of 
Utah to issue .and recei,Te absentee ballots. Plaintiff 
2 Initially adopted in Laws of 1897, Chapter L, Section 11. This 
exact language accompanied by a proviso was enacted in 1896, 
Laws of Utah, 1896, Chapter ·CXXVI, pp. 383-4, but the pro-
viso was dropped in 1897. 
3 The full text is Appendix A hereto. 
' This opinion is set forth in full in Appendix B he1·eto. 
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asserl1ed to defendant that he would be absent fron1 the 
precinct and county on election day, September 11, 1956, 
and reque.sted that he be issued a ballot and allowed to 
cast an absentee ballot in the Septe1nber 11, 1956 primary 
election, which would select nominees or candidates for 
United Strutes Senator, Representative in Congress, Gov-
ernor of Utah and other state and local office•s. Defend-
ant refused to issue plaintiff an .abs,entee ballot for the 
sole reason which he then stated in writing, as follows: 
"Under authority of Sec. 20-2-14, Paragraph 
11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, I, Porter L. 
:Merrell, Duchesne County Clerk, do hereby refuse 
to give a Ballot to Preston Allen of Altonah, Utah, 
bec.ause he has stated to me that he lives on an 
Indian Reservrution and did not es·tablish a resi-
dence in any other precinct in the State of Utah 
prior to this time .... ~' 
Defendant has advised plaintiff and others similarly 
situated that bec.ause of par. 11, Section 20-2-14, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, he in the future would not is,sue a 
ballot to any Indian residing on an Indian reservation 
unless the Indian applicant had established a residence 
in some county in Utah prior to establishing .a residence 
on the Indian reservation. 
Plaintiff brings this action to challenge defendant's 
action and seeks : 
(1) A mandatory order of this court directing de-
fendant as County Clerk of Duchesne County and all 
election officials of the State of Ut.ah and Duchesne 
County acting under his direction and control to refrain 
5 
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and desist from enforcing or applying Section 20-2-14, 
Utah Code Annartated, 1953, so as to deny plaintiff and 
other American Indians similarly situated, or any of 
them, the right to vote in any elections of the State of 
Utah, the County of Duchesne, or the community in which 
they reside for the sole reason that they, or any of them, 
are American Indians, reside on an Indian reservation 
or have never resided elsewhere in the State of Utah 
than on an Indian reservation; and 
(2) An order declaring that no Indian citizen shall 
be denied a right to register and vote, or either of them, 
by reason of his being an Indian, residing on an Indian 
reservation or never having resided elsewhere in the 
State of Utah than on an Indian reservation; or 
(3) In the event that this court is of the opinion 
that Section 20-2-14 is properly interpreted and valid, 
as applied by defendant to Indians residing on Indian 
reservations in Utah, then this court is requested to issue 
an injunction or n1andatory order restraining defendant 
from allowing any white person residing on non-Indian 
land within the former Uintah Indian Reservation from 
voting as a resident of Utah. 
Points Upon Which Plaj.ntiff Relies 
I. Indians Residing on Reservations in Utah, Like 
All Other A1nerican Indians, Are Citizens of the United 
States and the State in 'Yhieh They Reside and Are 
J~ntitled to All Privileges .and Inununities of Su~h 
Citizenship. 
6 
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II. The Denial of Voting Privileges to Indians Re-
siding on Indian Re~servations in Utah on the Sole 
Ground That They Have Not Resided Elsewhere in the 
State and For No Re~ason Connected With Capacity or 
Qualification to Vo~te Constitutes Discrimina,tion Between 
Indians ,and Non-Indians on Account of Race or Color 
and is Prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment. 
III. The Exclusion of Persons Residing on Indian 
ReS'ervations, Except Those \Vho Prior to Establishing 
Such Residence Have Established a Residence Els~ewhere 
in the State of Utah, From the Classification of Residents 
for Voting Purposes Constitutes Unreasonable and Dis-
criminatory Classification Precluded by the Privileges 
and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
IV. If Par. 11, Section 20-2-14 is Valid as Applied 
to Deny Indians Residing Within the Former Uintah 
Reservation the Right to Votre, Equal Protection and 
Application of the Law Requires that White Persons 
Residing Within the Former Reservation Also he Ex-
cluded from Voting. 
V. This Court Has Authority to Issue An Injunc-
tion or Other Equitabl~e Relief to Protect Plaintiff's 
Political Rights Guaranteed by The Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Indians Residing on Reservations in Utah, Like All 
Other Amerian Indians, Are Citizens of the United States 
7 
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and the State in Which They Reside and Are Entitled to 
All Privileges and Immunities of Such Citizenship. 
Since June 2, 1924, when Congress passed the Indian 
Citizenship Act ( 43 Srtat. 253) all Indians born within 
the territorial limits of the United States have been citi-
zens by virtue of that act. 5 The Nationality Act of 1940 
(54 Stat. 1137, 1138) eliminated any doubt as to the 
status of Indians born after the 1924 act6 and the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 
163, 8 U.S.C., Sec. 1401 codifies the previous legislation 
as follows: 
"(2) a person born in the United States rto 
a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or other 
aboriginal tribe: Provided, That the granting of 
citizenship under this subsection shall not in any 
manner impair or othernise affect the right of 
such person to tribal or other property;" (p. 122) 
By virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the ~. 
United States Constitution, Indians residing in Utah 
are citizens of that state. Section 1 of that amendment 
provides: 
5 This act naturalized 125,000 native-born Indians, Cohen's 
Handbook on Federal Indian Law, p. 153. 
6 In Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. (2d) 456, (1948) 
the court stated: 
"The Congress on June 2. 1924, 43 Stat. 253, declared all 
Indians to be citizens of the United States, 8 U.S.C.A. § 3, and 
then just prior to World "'ar II, on October 14, 1940, enacted 
the :Nationality Act of 1940,' U.S.C.A., Title 8, section 601, so 
as to clear up any doubt . created by the language of the Act 
of 1924 as to the status of Indians born after the effective date 
of the prior Act." (p. 459) 
See also Totus v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 7 (D.C. Wash., 
1941). 
8 
\ 
1 , 
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"All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the St1ate 
wherein they reside." 
In Deere v. State of New York, 22 F. 2d 851 (N.D. 
N.Y., 1927) the court stated in .addressing itself to a 
question- of diversity of citizenship: 
"An Indian, becoming a citizen or" the U nived 
States and residing in a state, is held to be a citi-
zen of that state. Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135-
162, ... " (p. 852) 
Nor can there any longer be a question that Indians 
residing on Indian reservations in Utah are residing in 
the State of Utah and citizens thereof.7 This que~stion 
was settled in United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 
where the Supreme Court held that the Ute Reservation 
in Colorado was within that state.8 As lwte as 1946 the 
Supreme Court in New York Ex Rel. Ray v. Mart in, 326 
U.S. 496 (1946) in following the 11-'fcBratney case, in .a 
case involving an Indian reservation in New York, stated 
with reference to the McBratney ease: 
"The holding in that case was that the Aet 
of Congress admitting Colorado into the Union 
overruled all prior inconsistent statutes and treat-
ies and placed it 'upon an equal footing with the 
original Strutes . . .'; that this meant that Colo-
rado had 'criminal jurisdiction over its own citi-
-----
-
7 This is impliedly admitted in the ruling of the present Attor-
ney General, Appendix B, par. 1. 
8 This opinion of the highest court in the land cannot be recon-
ciled with par. 11, Sec. 20-2-14 or the opinion of the Attorney 
General. See Oohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, p. 158 
to this effect. 
9 
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zens and other white persons throughout the whole 
of the territory within its limits, including the 
Ute Reservation'; and that consequently, the 
United States no longer had 'sole and exclusive 
jurisdiction' over the Reservation, except to the 
e:x!tent necessary to carry out such treaty provi-
sions which remained in force. That case has since 
been followed by this Court and its holding has not 
been modified by any act of Congress." (pp. 497-
498) 
Also, in Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, the 
Supreme Court had under consideration the Enabling 
Act of the State of :\Iontana and concluded that an In-
dian reservation is geographically, politically and govern-
mentally within the boundaries of the state wherein it 
is located, unless Congress upon admission of the state 
into the Union, has expressly excepted such reservation. 
In Porter v. Hall, 3± Ariz. 308, 271 Pae. 411 (1928) 
the Supreme Court of Arizona was considering an origin-
al action in that court, similar to the present action in 
this court, by an Indian seeking to establish his right 
to vote and to obtain a "Tit of 1nandamus against the 
county recorder to require hin1 to allow plaintiff to vote. 
One of the defenses was that " . . . the reservation in 
question, though geographically in Arizona, is politically 
and govermnentally without it, since it is not subject to 
the full jurisdietion of our [Arizona ·s] laws.·· The Su-
prerne Court c:arefull~- analyzed the Arizona Enabling 
Act, which is in all respects emnpa.rable to that of Utah, 
and held: 
"We have no hesitancy in holding, therefore, 1l 
that all Indi3Jl reservllltions in Arizona are within _ 
10 ' 
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,. 
the political and governmental, as well as geo-
graphical, boundaries of the state, and that the 
exception set forth in our Enabling Act applies 
to the Indian lands considered as property, and 
not as a territorial area withdrawn from the 
sovereignty of the state of Arizona. Plaintiffs, 
therefore, under the stipulation of facts, are resi-
<lents of the state of Arizona, within the meaning 
of section 2, articie 7, supra." (p. 415) 
Subsequently the Supreme Court of Arizona in 
Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. (2d) 456 followed 
its conclusion in Porter v. Hall, sttpra, as to Indians 
residing on Indian reservations in Arizona being resi-
dents of Arizona and .held that the Arizona constitution 
excluding persons under guardianship from suffrage did 
not extend to Indians living on reserv;ations, who were 
entitled to vote. 
In another leading case in Indian Affairs, the Dis-
tricJt Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate District of 
California, in considering a contention by a county that 
"reservation Indians are not residents of the county for 
the purpose of obtaining direct county relief under the 
code sections involved" made an extensive analysis of 
the legal and factual factors applicable and held in Acosta 
v. San Diego County, 126 Cal. App. 2d 455, 272 P. 2d 92, 
96, 99 (1954): 
"The decisions hold thak the United States 
does not have ~exclusive jurisdiction over Indian 
reservations in all respects. On the contr:ary, the 
state's jurisdiction extends to all matters which do 
no't interfere with the control which the f·ederal 
government has exercised over Indian affairs. 
11 
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The principle that Indian reservations are geo-
graphically, politically and governmentally within 
the boundaries of the state wherein they are lo-
cated, unle!ss Congress, upon admission of the 
State into the union, or otherwise, has by express 
words excepted such areas from that jurisdiction, 
was laid down by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in United States v. McBr.atney, 104 U.S. 
621, 26 L. Ed. 869 .... In the absence of such limit-
ing treaty provisions, tribal lands within the state 
are part of the state and subject to its jurisdic-
tion in many respects, regardless of whether or 
not the Indians themselves may be exempt from 
certain .aspects of that jurisdiction. Langford v. 
Monteith, 102 U.S. 145, 26 L. Ed. 53. 
• • • 
"The decree holding that plaintiff is a resi-
dent of the County of San Diego, State of Cali-
fornia, and that she is not disqualified from re-
ceiving the benefits provided for by section 2500 
of the Welfare and Institution Code by reason 
of the fact that she resides on an Indian reserva-
tion situated within the boundaries of this county 
must be sustained." (pp. 96-99) 
Other evidence of this eonclusion which has been 
considered by the courts includes the long history of 
federal legislation bearing on the issue. The states have 
been authorized by federal statute to enter upon Indian 
lands for the purpose of 1naking inspection of health and 
educational ronditions and enforcing sanitation and 
quarantine regulations, or for the purpose of enforce-
ment of rompulsory sc.hool aHendanee b~- Indian pupils. 
( 45 Stat. 1185; 60 Stat. 962; 25 U.S.C. ser. 231.) Under 
the FedeTal Highway Act ( 42 Stat. 212) Indian lands 
12 
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in Utah are deemed as n1uch a part of the area of the 
state as other privrute lands. Indian lands within the 
st~ate are counted, .along with public land, as a basis for 
additional federal road contributions. Rese·rvation In-
dians are counted in the federal census as residents of 
Utah and are included in the popu1a:tion figures which 
are used no1t only for determining representation in Con-
gress, but also .as a basis for the allocation of positions 
in the federal civil service and as a basis for various con-
tributions of the federal government to the edueation 
and welfare of the state. (Smith-Hughes Act of Febru-
ary 23, 1917, 39 Stat. 929, George-Harden Vocational 
Act of August 1, 1946, 60 Stat. 775; N:a;tional School 
Lunch Act of June 4, 1946, 60 Stat. 230). States have 
been authorized to condemn restrict~ed Indian lands in 
accordance with state laws. (See. 3, Act of Mar. 3, 1901, 
31 Stat. 1058-84; 25 U.S.C. Sec. 357. 
The statement by the court in Acosta v. San Diego 
Co~mty, 126 Cal. App. 2d, 455, 272 P. 2d 92, 97 is ·equally 
applicable to Utah : 
"No Indian reservation in San Diego County 
is self-sufficient, and no resident of any such 
reservation can help traveling beyond its borders, 
nor can he escape ordinary state cigare-tte, gaso-
line, sales or use taxes. Reservation Indians who 
purchase or possess unrestricted property outside 
the re~servation enjoy no more advantageous a tax 
status than their white fellow citizens." (p. 97) 
It having been shown that Indians living on reserva-
tions in Utah are citizens and residents of that st~ate, it 
must, therefore, follow that under Section 1, Amendment 
13 
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XIV of the Constitution of the ·united States, they are 
endowed with the rights, privileges and irrununities equal 
to those enjoyed by all other citizens and residents of the 
state. Oyama v. State of California, 332 U.S. 633, (1948); 
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 
(1948); Acosta v. San Diego County, supra, p. 98. 
II. The Denial of Voting Privileges to Indians Residing 
on Indian Reservations in Utah on the Sole Ground That 
They Have Not Resided Elsewhere in the State and For 
No Reason Connected With Capacity or Qualification to 
Vote Constitutes Discrimination Between Indians and Non-
Indians on Account of Race or Color and is Prohibited 
by the Fifteenth Amendment. 
The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
·united States provides: 
"Section 1. The right of citizens of the 
United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State 
on account of race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude." 
Denial of the right of suffrage to .an Indian because 
he is an Indian is prohibited by· this runendment. Also 
prohibited is the denial of suffrage to Indians of a par-
ticular rla.ss when other persons of the san1e class but 
of other race's are pennitted to yote. The denial of the 
fr:anrhise to illiterate Indians is unconstitutional, if 
white or black illitPrates are to Yote. Illiterates as a class 
may be prohibited frmn voting, but racial distinction 
within a class is repugnant to the Fifteenth Amendinent. 
Conceivable classifications could be arrived .at which if 
applied to Indians living on reservations and all other 
14 
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citizens as a class would lawfully eliminate reservation 
Indians from voting, but mere residence in a cert.ain por-
tion of the state of Utah as distinguished from another 
portion of the state is not such a lawful classification. 
It bears no relation to qualifieations to vote. Section 
20-2-14 ean have only one possible purpose or effect, 
namely, to exclude Indians residing on Indian reservations 
from voting. Stripped of all verbiage and sophistication 
this is purely and simply a classifieation and denial based 
upon raee or color.. The decided cases demonstrate that 
denial of suffrage to Indians because they are Indians 
and the allowance of suffrage to part of a class and not to 
the balance of the same class is prohibited. In 1871 the 
Unit,ed States District Court for Oregon stated with re-
spe~ct to the Fifteenth An1end1nent : 
" ... an Indian ... who is a citizen of the 
United States is entitled to vote, or rather he can-
not be excluded frorn this privilege on the ground 
of being an Indian, as that would be to exclude 
him on account of race." McKay v. Campbell, 16 
Fed. Cas. 161 ( 1871). 
A few years later the Supreme Court of the United 
States in United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 stated: 
"The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer 
the right of suffrage upon any one. It prevents 
the States, or the United States, however, from 
giving preference, in this particular, to one citi-
zen of the United States over another on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Before its adoption, this could be done. It was 
as much within the power of a State to exclude 
citizens of the "United States from voting on ac-
15 
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count of race, etc., as it was on account of age, 
property, or education. Now it is not. If citizens 
of one race having e;ertain qualifications are per-
mitted by law to vote, those of another having 
the same qualifications must be. Previous to this 
amendment, there was no constitutional guaranty 
against this discrimination: now there is." (pp. 
217-218) 
In Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 the Supreme Court 
in ruling that a provision of the Delaware Constitution 
restricting the right of suffrage to the white race was 
invalid and had been enlarged by the self-executing effect 
of the Fifteenth Amendment, made the following state-
ment which is particularly applicable to Section 20-2-14, 
which like the Delaware Constitutional provision, may 
have been valid when adopted but became invalid with 
the change of conditions and supreme law: 
"Beyond question the adoption of the Fif-
teenth Amendment had the effect, in law, to re-
moV1e from the State Constitution, or render in-
operative, that provision which restricts the right 
of suffrage to the white race. Thenceforward, the 
statute which prescribed the qualifications of 
jurors was, itself, enlarged in its operation, so as 
to embrace all who by the State Constitution, as 
modified by the supreme law of the land, were 
qualified to vote at a general election. The pre-
sumption should be indulged, in the first instance, 
that the State recognizes, as is its plain duty, an 
amendn1ent of the Federal Constitution, from 
the time of its adoption, as binding on all of its 
citizens and every departlnent of its government, 
and to be enforced, within its linlits, without 
reference to any inconsistent provisions in its 
own Constitution or statutes." (pp. 389-390) 
16 
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In Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) the 
Supreme Court struck down the so-called "grandfather 
clause" of the Oklahoma Constitution pointing out that 
the self-executing provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment 
eliminate any repugnant provisions in st:ate law: 
"(c) While in the true sense, therefore, the 
Amendment gives no right of suffrage, it was long 
ago recognized that in operation its prohibition 
might measurably have that effect; that is to say, 
that as the command of the Amendmentwas self-
executing .and reached without legislative action 
the conditions _of discrimination against which 
it was aimed, the result might ~arise that as a 
consequence of the_ striking down of a discriminat-
ing clause a right of suffrage would be enjoyed by 
reason of the· generic' 'char.acter of the provision 
which· would remain .after the discrimination was 
stricken out. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651; 
·Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370. A familiar illus-
tration of this doctrine re,sulted from the effect of 
the adoption of the Amendment on state consti-
tutions in which at the time of the adoption of the 
Amendment the right of suffrage was conferred 
on all white male citizens, since by the i:riherent 
power of the Amendment the word whit·e dis.ap-
peanid and .therefore all male citizens without 
discrimination ·on account of race, color- or pre-
vious condition of· servitude came under the gen-
eric grant·. of suffrage made by the State." (pp. 
362-363) 
In Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) the 
"grandfather clause" in Maryland was also declared in-
vaiid as a discrimination based on race. ' 
Furthermore, it cannot be contended that s.pecific 
words dealing with classification in terms of race or color 
17 
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must be found in the invalid statute for the Fifteenth 
Amendment to apply. The Supreme Court has made 
clear that where the practical effect and thrust of the 
statute is to accomplish a discrimination on the basis of 
race or color it is invalid. In Guinn v. United States, 
supra, the Court disposed of such a contention as follows: 
"We have difficulty in finding words to more 
clearly demonstrate the conviction we entertain 
that this standard has the characteristics which 
the Government attributes to it than does the mere 
statement of the text. It is true it contains no 
express words of an exclusion from the standard 
which it establishes of any person on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude 
prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment, but the 
standard itself inherently brings that result into 
existence since it is based purely upon a period 
of time before the enactment of the Fift~enth 
A1nendment and n1akes that period the controlling 
and dominant test of the right of suffr.age. In 
other words, \ve seek in vain for any ground which 
would sustain any other interpretation but that 
the provision, recurring to the conditions existing 
before the :E,ifteenth Amendment was adopted and 
the continuance of which the Fifteenth Amend-
ment prohibited, proposed by in substance and 
effect lifting those conditions over to a period of 
time after the Amendn1ent to make them the basis 
of the right to suffrage c.onferred in direct and 
positive disregard of the Fifteenth An1endJ.nent." 
( pp. 364-365) 
Ag<ain, in LanC' v. TVilson, 307 lT.S. ~68 (1939) the 
Court in eonsidering a suit for drunages under the civil 
right~ aet (8 r.R.C . ..t-3) by a negro deprived of a right 
to vote on tlre ha~is of another .. grandfather clause" in 
18 
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a revised Oklahoma Constitution pointed out that the 
Fifteenth An1endment extended to sophisticated as well 
as simple-minded discrimination: 
"We therefore cannot avoid passing on the 
merits of plaintiff's constitutional claims. The 
reach of the Fifteenth Amendment against contri-
vances by a state to thwart equality in the enjoy-
ment of the right to vote by citizens of the United 
States regardless of race or color, has been mnply 
expounded by prior decisions. Guinn v. United 
States, 238 U.S. 347; 11yers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 
368. The Amendment nullifies sophisticated ,as 
well as simple-minded modes of discrimination. 
It hits onerous procedural requirements which 
effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by 
the colored r.ace although the abstract right to 
vote may remain unrestricted as to race." (p. 275) 
It is also cle·arly established that the sanction of the 
Fifteenth Amendment extends to primary eleetions, such 
as the one involved in the denial of plaintiff's right to 
vote, as well as to general elections. In Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) the Supreme Court in dealing 
with the exclusion of Negro voters from a Texas primary 
election stated: 
"It may now be taken .as a postulate that 
the right to vote in such a primary for the nmni-
nation of candidates without discrimination by 
the State, like the right to vote in a general elec-
tion, is a right secured by the Constitution. 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. at 314; Myers 
v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368; Ex parte Yarbrough, 
110 U.S. 651, 663 et seq. By the terms of the Fif-
teenth Amendment that right may not he abridged 
by any State on account of race. Under our Con-
19 
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stitution the great privilege of the ballot may not 
be denied a man by the State because of his color." 
(pp. 661-662) 
See also Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) and 
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) to the same effect. 
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) to the contrary 
was expressly overruled by Smith v. Allwright, supra. 
In 1948, after the Arizona Supreme Court had de-
cided Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. 2d 456 
( 1948) allowing Indians the right to vote in Arizona, 
Chief Judge Orie L. Phillips, speaking for a three judge 
Federal court eli1ninated what was then thought to be 
the last discrilnination by any state in the Union against 
Indians in exercising suffrage. In that case, Trujillo v. 
Garley, unreported (printed as Appendix C hereto) the 
question was whether the ~ ew l\1:exico Cmistitution pro-
vision excluding from franchise "Indians not taxed" 
was invalid. Chief Judge Phillips stated: 
"So, we think we should decide the question 
of the constitutionality of the provision in the 
New l\1:exico Constitution. It says that 'Indians 
not taxed' 1uay not vote, although they possess 
every other qualification. 'V e are unable to escape 
the conclusion that, under the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments, that constitutes a discrimi-
nation on the ground of race. Any other citizen, 
regardless of race, in the State of X ew Mexico 
who has not paid one cent of tax of any kind or 
eharacter, if he possesses the other qualifications, 
1na~y vote." (pp. 6-7) 
~rhe court then "-ent on to analyze the contention 
that the provision did not really 1nean Indians not taxed 
but Indians that live in the pueblos in tribal relationship 
20 
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and held the distinction was not valid. Obviously refer-
ring to the previous Attorney General's rulings in Utah 
on SeC'tion 20-2-14, allowing Indians the right to vote, the 
court stated: 
"We know that the other states who have had 
similar requirements-Utah, one of the Dakot·as, 
I am not sure about Colorado, I know it has su~h 
a requirement-most of the other states, if nnt 
all, who have this requirement have .administra-
tively determined that it was a requirement which 
could not constitutionally be imposed by the state. 
\Vhile such rulings are not controlling, they, per-
haps, are entitled to consideration."9 (p. 8) 
Following the criteria of the Supreme Court in Lane 
v. Wilson, supra, and G-uinn v. United States, supra, i.e. 
excluding .all verbiage and considering discrimination a:s 
discrimination, whether it be simple-minded or sophis-
ticated, the Utah statute boils down to this. No test bear-
ing any relationship to voting knowledge or capaci·ty is 
imposed. If a person resides on an Indian reservation 
and has not previously established a residence elsewhere 
in the state he is excluded from voting. Whom does this 
apply to~ As administered it applies to (1) Indians 
who were born on the reservations and have never re-
sided elsewhere, and ( 2) Federal employees and their 
families. The latter may retain voting privileges in their 
home or domicile state and do not lose residence for vot-
ing purposes while in the Federal service. There is no 
9 In ·an opinion dated January 26, 1938, the Solicitor of the 
Department of the Interior analyzed similar provisions in the 
laws of Idaho, New Mexico and Washington and determined that 
they were invalid under the Fifteenth Amendment. 
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reason why they should vnte in Utah elections. On the 
other hand, if the Indians born on the reservation are to 
gain the franchise they are required to give up their 
native homeland, move away from their property, family 
and belongings and establish a residence elsewhere in the 
state. No other citizen or voter, other than an Indian, 
is imposed upon by such an unfair and unpurposeful re-
quirement. It bears no real shield to its racial dis-
crinlination. 
As a rnatter of fact, the r tah statute was not adopted 
with .any purpose in mind of avoiding racial discrimina-
tion or ereating equal treatment and classification for the 
Indians. ..A.t the time it was passed, Indians were not 
citizens and therefore ·were not entitled to vote. The 
Federal District Court for Oregon had ruled in JicKay 
v. Campbell, 16 Fed. Cas. 161 (1871) that Indians were 
not citizens under the Constitution _and the Fourteenth 
Amend1nent. The Suprerne Court in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 
l~.S. 9-1 (188-1) held that an Indian who had left tribal 
relations ·was not entitled to Yote in X ebraska, stating: 
"The plaintiff, not being a citizen of the 
United States under the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Constitution, has been deprived of no right 
secured bY the Fifteenth Alnendluent, and cannot 
rnaintain this .action." (p. 109) 
As has previously been dernonstrated, not only has 
the passage of ti1ne deYeloped as a rnatter of fact and 
law that Indian n•servations in Utal1 ar:e within the state, 
but the law has been changed so as to make Indians 
citizens. 
The self-executing provisions of the Fifteenth 
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Amend1nent, the Supre1ne law of the land, have eradi-
cated the conflicting provisions of Section 20-2-14 which 
are no longer in effect. See Guinn v. United States, 
supra. This was the concept of the Attorney General of 
Washington in an opinion dated April 1, 1936 (Opinion 
No. 4086 cited in the opinion of the Solicitor of the De-
partment of Interior referred to in footnote 9), with re-
spect to the Indian disfranchisement clause in the con-
stitution of Washington: 
"We are of the opinion, taking into consider-
ation the 15th Amendment and the Act of June 2, 
1924, that it is doubtful whether the provisions 
of Article VI of the state constitution with respect 
to Indians are now in effect." 
As will be demonstrated in the following section, 
there is no reasonable basis upon which discrimination 
against Indians residing on reservations can be made. 
All reasons have become ancient and .archaic and have 
disappeared. The discrimination is one purely on the 
basis of race or color and is invalid. 
III. The Exclusion of Persons Residing on Indian 
Reservations, Except Those Who Prior to Establishing Such 
Residence Have Established a Residence Elsewhere in the 
State of Utah, From the Classification of Residents for 
Voting Purposes Constitutes Unreasonable and Discrimina-
tory Classification Precluded by the Privileges and Immuni-
ties and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The Fourteenth An1endment provides in Section 1 
thereof: 
"No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State 
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deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws." 
There can be no doubt that the action of defendant 
is state action, if par. 11, Section 20-2-14, is still valid. 
He is authorized by statute to perform certain functions 
as an election official of the state and in exercising those 
functions purported to act in accordance with par. 11, 
Section 20-2-1-±. The question, therefore, is whether the 
statute, as applied and interpreted, denies plaintiff privi-
leges and immunities of citizenship or equal protection of 
the laws. 
The Fourteenth Alnendment protects the funda-
mental rights of citizens. 'Vith respect to the importance 
of suffrage, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Allwr·ight, 
321 U.S. 649 (19-±-±) stated, at p. 66-±: 
"The l~nited States is a constitutional demoC-
racy. Its organic law grants to all citizens a right 
to participate in the choice of elected officials 
without restriction by an~~ State because of race." 
A full and cmnplete state1nent of this basic premise 
of our :F,ederal constitutional republic is stated by the 
Fourth Circuit in Rice Y. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (1947), 
Cert. denied 333 U.S. 875 (1948), as follows: 
"An essential feature of our form of govern-
ment is the right of the citizen to participate in 
the govern1nental process. The political philoso-
phy of the Declaration of Independence is that 
governn1ents deriYe their just powrers fron1 the 
consent of the governed: and the right to a voice 
in the selection of officers of government on the 
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p.art of all citizens· is important, not only as a 
means of insuring that gove,rnment shall have the 
strength of popular support, but also as a means 
of securing to the individual citizen proper con-
sideration of his rights by those in power. The 
disfranchis.ed can never speak with the same force 
as those who are .able to vote. The Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments were written into the 
Constitution to insure to the Negro, who had re-
cently been liberated from slavery, the equal pro-
tection of the laws and the right to full participa-
tion in the process of government. These amend-
ments have had the effe.ct of creating a fede:ral 
basis of citizenship and of protecting the rights of 
individuals and Ininorities from many abuses of 
governmental power whi0h were not contemplated 
at the time." (p. 392) 
The Supreme Court of Arizona in Harrison v. La-
veen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. 2d 456 (1948) in upholding the 
right of Indians in Arizona to vote stated: 
"In a democracy suffrage is the most basic 
civil right, since its exercise is the chief means 
whereby other rights may be safeguarded. To 
deny the right to vote, where one is legally entitled 
to do so, is to do violence to the principles of 
freedom and equality." (196 P. 2d 456, 459). 
~Ir. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court in Nixon 
v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) stated with respect 
to the Fourteenth Amendment: 
"That Amendment 'not only gave citizenship 
and the privileges of citizenship to persons of 
color, but it denied to any State the power to 
withhold from them the equal protection of the 
laws .... '" 
Of course, not only does the equal protection clause 
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apply to Indians, as well as all persons within the juris 4 
diction of a state, but the privileges and immunities 
clause also applies to Indians. Deere v. State of New 
York, 22 F. 2d 851 (1927). 
While under the equal protection clause the States 
may make classifications and could in the instant case 
make classifications of persons entitled to vote, those 
classifie;ations n1ust be based on some reasonable basis 
and bear a relation to a lawful purpose. Tigner v. Texas, 
310 U.S. 141 (1940); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 
( 1886). Not only must classification be uniformly ap-
plied, but if a classification fair and reasonable on its 
face is administered in an unequal and unfair manner 
such action violates the ~-,ourteenth Amendment. Y ick 
Wo v. Ilopkins, supra. 
In the instant case the ruling of the Attorney General 
of Utah, being applied to exclude plaintiff and others 
similarly situated from suffrage reads in its "conclu-
sion": "No facilities are necessary for Indians living on 
reservations." In its final paragraph the ruling reads: 
"Accordingly, Indians who live on the reser-
vations are not entitled to Yote in rtah and a 
Board of County Conunissioners has no duty to 
provide then1 with voting facilities." 
There is no mention of any other group or class, 
except Indians. The ruling is addressed to the question 
of Indians residing on re~ern1tions and is applied to 
Indians alone. It is discrilninatory and so is the applica-
tion of the statute. 
The statute itself does not in1pose a reasonable and 
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valid classification. There is no valid reason why Indians 
residing on Indian reservations should be treated differ-
ently from those residing off the reservations. No test of 
literacy, edu0ation, public interest or other £:actors rela-
tive to voting qualifications is made. There can be no 
valid reason why Indians on reservations should be ex-
cluded from residents for voting purposes, any more than 
residents of "Federal Heights" or ":Mill Creek" who 
have not resided elsewhere in the state (including Indian 
reservations) should be excluded. It is .axiomatic that 
some of the leading college graduates residing on the 
Uintah Indian Reservation, or land formerly within the 
reservation, are perhaps more qualified to vote than 
less educated and experienced citizens re,siding elsewhere 
in the state. 
As indieated by Attorney Gener.als Chez and Gile~s 
in the opinion issued by them in 1940 (Appendix A), con-
siderations which may have once prompted classification 
of residents of Indian reservations differently from other 
citizens of Utah have now evaporated with the passage of 
time and the reversal of :B,eder.al Indian policy from that 
of concentr:ating Indians on reservations to one of edu-
cation and increasing economic security to enable the 
Indian citizen to assume complete jurisdiction over his 
own affairs and to participate fully in the ,activities of 
the state in which he resides.10 
10 This statement of change of attitude by the Federal govern-
ment is the substance of the policy stated in a letter dated July 
21, 1948 from the ·Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
to the Department of Justice. Obviously this policy is a complete 
change from that which pertained in 1897 when the Utah legi,s.-
lature passed par. 11, Section 20-2-14. 
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Since the Utah legislature in 1897 passed the statute 
now in question not only has the Indian obtained full 
citizenship, but he has been invested with many other 
rights and privileges to lessen his difference from his 
white neighbor. The most recent federal action in this 
direction was to provide for the termination of Federal 
supervision over certain Indi·ans and Indian tribes in 
Utah and other states. 
The Act of August 27, 1954, 68 Stat. 868, provides 
for a plan of termination of Federal supervision over 
certain of the members of the Ute Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation. Plaintiff is Vice-Pres-
ident of the non-profit Utah Corporation organized to 
manage their affairs by the group of "mixed-bloods" as 
to which supervision is in the process of being terminated. 
The Act of September 1, 1954 ( 68 Stat. 1099) provided 
for the termination of Federal supervision over the 
property of the Shivwit, Kanosh, Koosharem and Indian 
Peaks Bands of the Paiute Indian Tribe in Utah. These 
termination bills conten1plate that the states will assume 
further and complete govern1nental responsibility for 
such s~ervices as education, law enforce1nent, agricul-
tural .assistance to the Indians concerned and other 
functions will be transferred to agencies of the state 
or local governn1ent in the same 1nanner as they are 
provided nonnally for other citizens. 
On August 15, 1953 the President signed three acts 
designed to further reduce the setting apart of Indians. 
Public Law '277, 67 Stat. 586, renloYed discrinrinations 
with respect to purchase of liquor by Indians. Public 
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Law 280, G7 Stat. 588, provided for the conferring of full 
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations 
in five states and provided means for extending the act 
to other st1ates. Public Law 281, 67 Stat. 590, ended a 
long-standing discrimination ag.ainst Indians with respect 
to personal property and loans on cattle they own. 
The denial of the franchise to the Indians residing 
on Indian reseTvations who have nnt established a res-
idence elsewhere in the State of Utah prior to establish-
ing residence on the reserv:ation cannot be justified on 
any ground which is not discriminatory on account of 
race or color or does not constitute unre1asonable and 
unequal classification or treatment of citizens of the same 
class and characteristics. 
A. Arguments Often Advanced As Affording A 
Basis For A Distinction As To Indians Do Not 
Constitute A Valid Basis For Separate Class-
ification For Voting Purposes. 
1. Indian reservations are not exterritorial to a 
state and persons of the same class within a state must 
be treated alike. We have heretofore analyzed the de-
cisions and the legislative and factual considerations 
demonstrating that persons residing on Indian reser-
vations are in fact and in law within the State of Utah. 
United States v. McBratney) 104 U.S. 621; New York ex 
rel. Ray v. Martin) 326 U. S. 496 (1946); pp. 10-15, supra. 
A number of leading cases have held that once it is es-
tablished that Indians are resident~s of a state and cit-
izens thereof, they are entitled to vote as such and .any 
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classification which excludes Indian citizens for voting 
purposes because of residence on a reservation is invalid. 
Trujillo v. Garley (D.C.N .M., unreported, Appendix C 
hereto); Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 Pac. 2d 
456 (1948); Swift v. Leach, 178 N.W. 437 (N.D., 1920); 
State v. Norris, 37 Neb. 299,55 N.W.1086 (1893). 
2. Reservation Indians are not exempt from state 
jurisdiction exercised ,within constitutional limits. In-
dians residing on reservations in Utah are clearly not 
exempt from operation of state law. When a reservation 
Indian is away from the reservation, he is subject to 
state law in exactly the same way as is any other citizen. 
SrP Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, p. 119, 
fn. 3-1. Congress has repealed the bulk of those ancient 
federal statutes which draw a distinction between the 
statu:-; of Indian citizens and other persons outside of 
a resen:ration. See, for example, Public Law 277, 83d 
Cong., approved August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 586), making 
inapplicable to any area that is not "Indian Country," 
1.~ r.f'.C. § 115-l-. 1156. 3113, 348S and 3618, the so-called 
lndian liquor laws~ Public Law 2Sl, 83d Cong., approved 
.\ugu:-:t 15, 1n:-1:1 ((il ~tat. 590), repealinglawswhichpro-
llihit purc·ha:-;p:-; from Indians of hunting articles, cooking 
utf'n:-:il:-; and clothin~ and t11e sale to Indians of arms 
nwi ammunition, and modifying the laws prohibiting the 
.--:tiP or n<'qniring loans on livestork purchased for Indians 
h~· the United States, 25 lT.S.C. § 195, 265, 266; 18 U.S. C. 
§11[)1. 
'Y"ith tl1e Pxception of tl1e so-called ten major crimes 
pnni~h:tldt> h~· fc>(h'rnl la"· (Aet. of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 
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683, 827; 18 U.S. C. § 1153) and other crimes by Indians 
against Indians which might be tried in tribal courts, 
for example, all offenses committed on Indian reser-
vations either by Indi:ans or by non-Indians are punish-
able in the federal courts under state statute's. Act of 
June 28, 1948, S1tpra, 18 U.S.C. §§ 13, 1152. United States 
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). State taxing power 
has been extended to Indian reservations. See the Act 
of May 28, 1924 ( 43 Stat. 244, 25 U.S. C. § 398); Act of 
l\{arch 3, 1927 ( 44 Stat. 1347). See, also, Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943). 
3. Indians are sui juris. Plaintiff and other Indians 
are permitted to sue like other citizens in state and 
federal courts. Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 332 (1892). 
They may execute contracts. Cohen's Handbook of Fed-
eral Indian Law, pp. 164-166. See Harrison v. Laveen, 
67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. (2d) 456 (1948), for a complete dis-
position of the argument that Indians are not sui juris. 
4. Indians are not persons under guardianship. 
Efforts have been made to exclude Indians from voting 
on the grounds that they are persons under guardianship 
or that they are wards. This argument is not valid. 
Harrison v. Laveen, s1tpra, overruling Porter v. Hall, 
34 Ariz. 308, 271 Pac. 411 (1928). The word "ward" is 
used in many senses but in connection with Indians it 
has no connotation of incapacity as to property which 
they themselves own. Cohen's Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law, pp. 169-173; Harrison v. Laveen, supra. 
It may be helpful here to correct certain common 
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impressions with respect to Indians living on reser-
vations. 
(.a) Despite widespread opinions to the con-
trary, Indians are not confined to reservations and no 
official has custody of the persons residing on Indian 
reservations. While in years past there was a practice, 
unauthorized by statute, of requiring the issuance of a 
pass to Indians desiring to leave the reservation, this 
practice has long been obsolete. Cohen's Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law, pp. 176-177. Today Indians need 
no pennission to leave a reservation and travel to and 
from the reservation just as any other citizens travel 
to and from their own farn1s or homes. As a matter of 
fact, with the allotment and opening of the Utah reser-
vatron upon which plaintiff resides, the identity of the 
reservation as such has, for practical purposes, been 
destroyed. 
(b) Not only does no federal official have the 
right to the custody of the person of an Indian, but an 
Indian is entitled to habeas corpus if any federal official 
seeks to detain him without a warrant. United States ex 
rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 Fed. Cas. X o. 14891, C.C. 
Nebr. (1879). 
5. Indians are not incompetent persons. "While it 
is sometimes said that certain reservation Indians have 
not received "certificates of emnpetency," this term is 
a word of .art having to do with the status of his property 
and not of his person. A reseiTation Indian n1ay handle 
his own affairs. He does not have to obtain permission 
or consult any governmental or tribal official as to where 
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he shall live, what en1ployment he shall seek .and perform, 
whom he shall marry or as to other matters, the decision 
as to which is ordinarily reserved for competent persons. 
He has been subjected to military service equally with 
other citizens. Totus v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 7 
(D.C. Wash., 1941). It is common knowledge that many 
Indians, including those entering the military service 
directly from Indian reservations, have served their 
country with distinction in recent conflicts. They are 
entitled to GI loans and benefits and many Indians 
whose resideces are on reservations in Utah are attending 
leading educational institutions .and establishing out-
standing records. Many Indians hold le·ading public 
positions of responsibility, one being the Chief Justice 
of the Supre1ne Court of Oklahoma. 
6. Indians residing on reservations require repre-
sentation by officials in whose election they have a voice. 
Almost every session of Congress enacts legislation of 
fundamental importance to Indians as a group. This 
special legislation governs the lives and property of 
Indians on reservations. In addition, Indians generally 
are subjected to the same laws as other citizens. One 
of the fundament,al concepts of our constitutional democ-
racy, with its republican form of government, is th.at all 
citizens should have an opportunity of lending their 
voice to the selection of those who will represent them 
in enacting the laws of the land. Upon this basic concept 
is founded the slogan "Taxation without representation 
is tyranny." Because of the status and unique historical 
background of Indians and their special relationship to 
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federal and state governments, legislation and adminis-
trative action as to them has become more intimate and 
complicated perhaps than that applicable to any other 
group of citizens. For this reason it is possibly more 
important that Indians be given an opportunity to join 
in the selection of lawmakers and officials than it is 
that any other group be given the opportunity. 
The foregoing background places in bold relief the 
question: "On what reasonable basis may Indians re-
siding on Indian Reservations become a separate class 
for exclusion from voting privilege~s ~" Why does the 
Utah strutute exclude only residents of Indian ·and mil-
itary reservations, yet rernain silent as to all other kinds 
of reserv;ations and withdrawals, such as game sanctu-
aries, bird refuges, reclamation withdrawals and re-
serves, national forests, stock driveways, federal power 
withdrawals and other such areas. The simple reason is 
that the legislature desired in 1897, when it was con-
stitutional to do so, to exclude (1) soldiers and (2) In-
dians. Soldiers could lawfully be excluded, then and now. 
They do not est,ablish a residence in Utah, since they are 
not residing on military reservations in the usual sense 
of establishing residence. The general rule as to soldiers 
is stated in 18 Arn. Jur. at p. 224 as follows: 
" ... it is the general rule that a soldier or 
sailor does not gain a voting residence in a par-
ticular place by reason of his 1nere presence there 
while in the perfonnance of his duty. Conversely, 
a soldier or sailor does not lose his residence for 
voting purposes on account of his employment, 
even though he uuty, during his period of service, 
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change his residence, where his intention to retain 
his original residence is sufficiently shown." 
The same rule applies to persons in government 
service. 18 Am. Jur. p. 223. 
The Indian under the operation of the Utah st~atute 
does not have the privilege of ballot guaranteed to mil-
itary men. He must move off the reservation, leave his 
home and property to qualify. This is an unreasonable, 
unequal .and unconstitutional classification. 
B. The Supreme Court of the United States in the 
Past Twenty-Five Years Has Given Broad In-
terpre,tation to the Protection Afforded By the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
In recent years, not only has the Supreme Court 
given extensive consideration to the validity of exclu-
sions of persons from voting, see pp. 17-21, supra, but 
it has been liberal in interpreting guaranties provided in 
the Fourteenth Amendment. InBuchanan v. Warley, 
245 U.S. 60 (1917), it held that no state may prohibit 
any person from occupying a residence in a particular 
area or c1ass of areas. In Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948), and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), it 
has been held that the Fourteenth Amendment even 
precludes the enforcement of restrictive racial covenants 
and agreements with respect to property. Both state 
and federal courts have held that state laws denying 
Indians or other racial minorities the same privileges 
to hunt or fish that are enjoyed by other re~sidents of 
the state are directly in violation of the United States 
Constitution. See, e.g., Takahasni v. Fish and Game 
35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). In Bradley v. Arizona 
Corp. Comm., ?O Ariz. 508, 141 P~ac. 2d 524 (1943), the 
St:ipreme -Court of Arizona upheld the constitutional right 
of.an Indian to sue to obtain a certificate of convenience 
or necessity for the operation of a motor vehicle as a 
contract carrier. The United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia ruled in State of Arizona v. 
Hobby, (D.C. D.C., March 3, 1953, unreported) that a 
state may not constitutionally bar persons of Indi:an 
blood residing on Indian reservations from participating 
in Social Security benefits administered by the state. 
Finally, in the field of public education, the-~Supreme 
Court has extended the effect of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to prohibitingthe states and the District of Colum-
bia from maintail)ing racially segregated public schools. 
Brown v. BoCJ;rd of_ Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See also 111 issouri· 
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipnel v. 
Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629 (1950); illcLawriJ~ v. Oklalzoma State Regents, 
3·39 u.s. 637-(1950). 
IV. If Par. 11, Sec.· 20·2-1-l, is Valid as Applied To 
Deny Indians Residing Within The Former Uintali Iridian 
Reservation The Right to Vote, -Equal Protection and Ap~. 
plication Of The. Law Requires T_hat White._ Persons Re-
siding Within The Former Reservation Also Be Excluded 
From Voting. · · · · 
. Th~ thrust of the interpretation of :Jiareh 23, 1956, 
by the Attorney General of Utah is to deny Indians 
residing on re~rlTntions and who have riever established 
a rrHidenee elsewhere the Yoting facilities and the right 
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to vote. There is nothing in the opinion of the Attorney 
General or the .action of defendant to indicate that white 
persons residing within the exterior limits of the Uintah 
Indian Reservation established by Executive Order of 
October 3, 1861, and the Act of :May 5, 1864, 13 Stat. 
63, were equally with Indians, to be denied the right to 
vote. As a matter of fact, it is admitted by defendant 
that white persons residing on non-Indian land within 
the former reservation are being allowed to register and 
vote. ~lore than 500,000 acres of the Uintah Reservation 
were sold at public auction in 1910, 1912 and 1917, and 
were purchased by non-Indians. Large .additional areas 
of land have been the subject of homesteads, mineral 
locations, entries and patents. It is clearly established 
federal law that even patented land within an Indian 
Reservation remains part of the reservation. United 
States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909). In Tooisgah 
v. United States, 186 F. 2d 93 (1955), the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appe.als stated: 
"Once reservation is established all tracts 
included within it remain ,a part of the reservation 
until separated therefrom by Congress." (p. 94) 
As a matter of fact, even if classification ean be 
sustained on the ground that the legislature may lawfully 
exclude residents of one part of the state from suffrage 
at the s.ame time it allows residents of another part of 
the state to vote, it would be axiomatic that equal pro-
tection and application of the laws would preclude a 
second discrimination within the classification, that of 
allowing whites in that are.a to vote but denying Indians 
in the same are:a a right to vote. 
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Since under the Fourteenth Amendment the State 
of Utah is required to grant equal protection of the laws 
to all persons subject to its jurisdiction, the election 
officials of Ut~ah must be required to trent whites and 
Indians on the former Uintah Reservation alike. 
Therefore, in the event this Court should fail to 
grant the mandatory relief prayed for to guarantee 
Indians residing on reservations in Utah a right to vote, 
then a mandatory order should issue requiring the equal 
application of the law by the denial of the right to white 
persons simiLarly situated. 
V. This Court Has Authority to Issue an Injunction 
Or Other Equitable Relief to Protect Plaintiff's Political 
Rights Guaranteed By The Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. 
The rights asserted by plaintiff are fundamental con-
stitutional rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments. As demonstrated by the opinion of 
Chief Judge Phillips, such rights are legitimately pro-
tected by injunction or other equitable remedies .and 
this is so, even though the right protected is a political 
right. Trujillo v. Garley (unreported, Appendix C). 
In Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. ~d 387 (1947), cert. den. 
333 U.S. 875 (1948), the Court concluded that the action 
of state officials in a Denwcratic primary denied the 
constitutional rights of a negro and that injunctive relief 
was appropriate. It stated at p. 39~: 
"There can be no question, therefore, as to 
the jurisdiction of the court to grant injunctive 
relief, whether the suit be Yiewed as one under 
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the general provision of 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1) to 
protect right1s guaranteed by the Constitution, 
or under 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (11) to protect the 
right of citizens of the United States to vote, 
or under 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (14) to redress the 
deprivation of civil rights." 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff and other American Indians residing on 
Indian reserv,a;tions in Utah are citizens of the United 
States and the state in which they reside. As such, they 
are, under the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, entitled to all the 
rights, privileges and immunities of citizens. Since the 
Utah legislature enacted paragraph 11, Sec. 20-2-14, 
the Uint.ah Reservat~on has been opened for settlement 
and has been allotted in part to individual Indians. Also, 
since that time Congress has extended citizenship to 
the Indians residing on reservations in Utah. Sec. 20-2-
14, as construed and applied by defendant to exclude 
from suffrage Indians residing on Indian reservations. 
in Utah who have not established residence elsewhere 
in the State of Utah prior to taking up residence on the 
reservation, constitutes an unlawful discrimination on 
account of race and color. Paragr.aph 11 so construed 
and applied, constitutes unreasonable classification in 
violation of the equal proteetion clause and the privileges 
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
By the self-executing provisions of the superior federal 
law, the ],ourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, such 
portions of par. 11 which direct such action, automatic-
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ally became inoperative because of their invalidity upon 
the extension of citizenship in 1924 to all Indians born 
in the U nrted States. The mandatory relief sought by 
the plaintiff should be granted and the alternative writ 
made permanent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILKINSON, CRAGUN, 
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7 44 Jackson Place, N. W. 
Washington 6, D.C. 
Counsel to National Congress 
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APPENDIX A 
OFFICE O:b.., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY 14, UTAH 
October 25, 1940 
Mr. Sterling John Talbot 
Whiterocks, Utah 
Dear Reverend Talbot : 
I am pleased to give you the folowing views relative 
to my interpretation of the application of the provisions 
of Subdivision (11), Section 25-2-14, Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1933, which reads: 
"For the purpose of registration or voting 
the place of residence of any person must be 
governed by the following rules as far as they 
are applicable: 
* * * * 
"(11) Any person living upon an Indian or 
military reservation shall not be deemed a r.es-
ident of Utah within the meaning of thi'S chapter 
unless such person had acquired a residence upon 
such Indi~an or military reservation." 
You are interested to know whether the foregoing 
statute longer applies to the Uintah Indian Reservation 
in Utah since the unallotted lands of that Reservation 
by an Act of Congress of the United States, approved 
May 27, 1902, (32 Stat. 263) were restored to the public 
domain, and since by a proclamation of the President 
of the United States, dated July 14, 1905, such lands 
were declared open to entry. The lands so restored to 
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entry have largely passed into private ownership both 
among -the white and Indian settlers. Registration and 
voting districts have since been estabHshed thereon, 
and the occupants of those lands have vot~d, so I am 
informed, within such voting precinct as late as 1928 
when the provisions of the foregoing statute wer~ called 
to their attention and the exercise of the franchise with-
in that locality challenged. I understand that with the 
recurrence of each election this matter has been a serious 
bone of contention among the people in Uintah County. 
After an ·extended study of this problem I am of 
the opinion that the statute in question cont~mplated a 
clO'sed reservation. :.Moreover, the changed conditions in 
the locality in question with reference to the attitude 
taken toward the occupants of the lands in question by 
both State and county public authorities in the assess-
ment, levying, and collection of taxe·s, together with the 
general jurisdiction assumed by State and county public 
officials over the affairs of the citizens residing upon 
the domain within the reservation, indicat~s clearly the 
inapplicability of the statute in question. Prior to the 
time when the unallotted lands within the reservation 
were declared open to entry, the Federal Government 
exercised exclusive jurisdiction, and access to the reser-
v.ation was forbidden except by military pass. As stated 
above, since the unallotted lands were thrown open to 
entry, voting precinct·s have been established and State, 
county and school tax:es have been levied and collected 
as well as inemne, cigarette, n1otor car and ~ales taxes 
from thoRe residing upon the open reservation. 
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It will be noted the statute refers to residence in 
some county in Utah, not sonw other county. Therefore, 
when the reservation was thrown open to homestead 
settlers it is entirely reasonable to assume that the 
reason for segregating that territory from Uintah County 
for ele~ction purposes no longer persisted. Then, too, 
it must be observed that the attitude of the Government 
towards the Indians then1selves with relation to voting 
privileges has changed materially since the Utah statute 
in que~stion was enacted. By Federal Act approved June 
2, 1924, all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial 
limits of the United States are declared to be citizens 
of the United States. The Act further provides that the 
granting of citizenship shall not in any manner impair 
or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to trib.al or 
other property. (U.S. Stat. at Large, Vol. 43, p. 253) 
Under Amendment XV to the Federal Constitution, 
Section 1, the right of any citizen of the United States 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of race, color, or pre-
vious condition of servitude. 
Under the Federal Constitution, the Acts of Con-
gress and the Constitution .and laws of this State, there-
fore, I am of the opinion that the Indians themselves 
residing upon the Uintah Reservation who are of the age 
of twenty-one years, and who are otherwise eligible under 
l;tah law, are eligible to vote within the precinct within 
which they are residing though such precinct may be 
within the territorial boundaries of the Uintah Reser-
vation. 
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If I am correct in this conclus1on there would seem 
to be no rhyme or reason in applying the provisions of 
subdivision ( 11), supra, to persons other than Indians 
residing upon the Uintah Reservation. 
It is, however, in the final analysis a matter which 
is of sufficient importance to warrant the earnest con-
sideration of the next Legislature, and if there is doubt 
of the correctness of my conclusions, the remedy lies 
with the Legislature. Certain I am that the changed 
conditions and circumstances, together with recent enact-
ments of Congress regarding voting privileges of In-
dians themselves, calls for further attention of ,the 
Legislature to the statute question. Meantime I am 
clearly of the opinion that the doubt should be resolved 
in f'RV'Or of granting the franchise to the citizens re-
siding in the Uintah Reservation rather than denying 
the 'same. 
Kindest personal regards. 
Very truly yours, 
Approved: 
jsj Joseph A. Chez 
Attorney General 
/s/ Gover A. Giles 
Assistant ~~ttorney General · 
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Secretary of State 
Building 
APPENDIX B 
March 23, 1956 
REQUESTED BY: Hon. Lamont F. Toronto, Secre-
tary of State 
OPINION BY: 
QUESTION: 
CONCLUSION: 
E. R. Callister, Attorney General 
K. Roger Bean, Assistant Attorney 
General 
'\tVho has the re1sponsibility of pro-
viding voting facilities for Indians~ 
No f.acilities are necessary for In-
dians living on reservations. 
Indians who are born in the United States are cit-
izens of the United States. 8 U.S.C.A., Section 1401. As 
such, they are entitled to the ·same voting privileges as 
other citizens. Constitution of Utah, Article IV, Section 
2. But like other citizens, they must establish a voting 
residence in Utah in accordance with the terms of Sec-
tion 20-2-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Paragraph 11 
of that section provides as follows: 
"(11) Any person living upon any Indian or mil-
itary reservation shall not be deemed a resident 
of Utah within the meaning of this chapter, unless 
such person had acquired a residence in some 
county in Utah prior to taking up his residence. 
upon such Indian or military reservation." 
Accordingly, Indians who live on the reservations 
are not entitled to vote in Utah and a Board of County 
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Commissioners has no duty to provide them with voting 
facilitiers. Indians living off the reservation may, of 
course, register and vote in the voting district in which 
they reside, the same as any other citizen. 
ERC:gq 
Yours very truly, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
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APPENDIX C 
ABSTRACT OF REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
UNREPORTED OPINION OF THREE-JUDGE FED-
ERAL COURT IN NEvV l\1EXICO VOTING CASE, 
TRUJILLO V. GARLEY 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 
MIGUEL H. TRUJILLO, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
ELOY GARLEY, as County Clerk 
and ex officio County Recorder of 
Valencia County, New Mexico, 
Defendant. 
No. 1353 
JUDGE PHILLIPS orally delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
Now, this matter comes before the Court at this 
time on an application for a preliminary injunction, man-
datory in character, which would restr.ain the registra-
tion officials, the County Clerk, from refusing to register 
the plaintiff as a qualified elector in his precinct, and 
all other persons similarly situated with the plaintiff. 
The right was denied by the county official, the County 
Clerk, on the ground that the plaintiff was .an "Indian 
not taxed," and that notwithstanding that he had paid 
excise taxes, and denial of the, right to register being 
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based upon the fact that he had not paid ad valorem 
taxes on real or personal property. 
The Constitutional provision in question is Section 
1 of Article 7 of the Constitution of the State of New 
Mexico, which provides that every male citizen of the 
United States who is over the age of twenty-one years 
and has resided in New Mexico twelve months, in the 
county ninety days, and in the precinct in which he offers 
to vote thirty days, next preceding the election, except 
idiots, insane persons, persons convicted of a felonious 
or infamous crime, unless restored to political rights, 
and then comes the provision here n1aterial, and "Indians 
not taxed," shall be qualified to vote at all elections for 
public officers. 
In disposing of the application for a preliminary 
injunction, the Court will find the facts specifically as 
they are set forth in the stipulation of the parties. 
Three preliminary questions are raised. One is that 
the plaintiff here asserts a political right, and that courts 
of equity should not grant redress for protection of what 
are regarded as political rights in the strict sense of 
that term, and that the plaintiff's remedy is an action 
at law. The right asserted here is a right guaranteed 
by the :B,ourteenth and Fifteenth A1nendments to the 
Con~titution of the Pnited States, and implemented by, 
statutory provisions. The Act of April 20, 1871, the 
part now found in 8 U.S.C.A. in Section 43, says that 
every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, eust:mn or usage of any state or territory 
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subject~ or caused to be ~ubjected any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall 
be liable to the p.arty injured in an action at law, suit 
in equity, or other proper proceeding of redress. Under 
the statute, and the more recent adjudications~and par-
ticularly the case of Rice v. Elmore, decided by the 
Fourth Circuit and reported in 165 Federal 2d, 387, and 
other kindred cases-we think injunction is an appro-
priate remedy for the redress of the claim or right here 
a'Sserted. 
The second is that the Indian pueblos are not a part 
of the State of New :Mexico. The United States does 
not exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the pueblo In-
dian areas. For certain purposes, they are within the 
jurisdiction of the State of New Mexico. We think they 
are a part of it. In this conection, see United States v. 
~[cBratney, 104 U.S. 621. 
The final preliminary question is whether this Court 
should at this time undertake to decide the constitutional 
question involived, for the .asserted reasons that it in-
volves a construction of the phrase "Indians not taxed" 
which had not yet been authoritatively construed by the 
Supreme Court of New :Mexico; that this Court should 
not indulge in academic constructions of the state statutes 
for the purpose of determining constitutional questions, 
but should relegate the parties to an action in the state 
court where the meaning of the phrase involved will be 
determined hy the state court; and that the constitutional 
49 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
issue, if any remains, will be clear cut. It is well settled 
that the Federal courts should avoid the determination 
of constitutional questions where construction of state 
statutes or state laws are involved and should wait until 
there has been an authoritative determination of the 
meaning of the state law by the state courts before the 
constitutional question is determined. Accordingly, it 
has been held many times that if, under one construction 
of a state statute or constitutional provision, the con-
stitutionality of the law would be clear, wheras under 
another construction the law would be unconstitutional, 
the Federal court should not undertake a construction 
in advance of the determination by the state Supreme 
Court. And it has also been held that such .a course 
should be followed if under a given construction the con-
stitutional question would disappear from the case. 
Those principles are laid down in Spector Motor 
Service v. 1\IcLaughlin, Tax Commissioner, 323 U.S. 101, 
the l\1:eridith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228. 
In the instant case the plaintiff is confronted with 
this situation, that the administrative authorities con-
strued this constitutional provision to prohibit ~ from 
voting unless he has paid ad valorem taxes oit real or 
personal property. That construction is son1ewhat in-
dicated, if not clearly held, in the recent decision of the 
Supreme Court of New ~Iexico in Tapia v. Lucero, No. 
5082, decided July 13, 1948, wherein the court said: "On 
the new trial, in view of what \Ye have said, the unsatis-
factory state of the proof on the ilnportant issue whether 
the plaintiff aiHl other 1ne1nbers of the pueblo Indian 
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tribes pay ad valoren1 taxes, no doubt will be clarified 
and settled by a specific finding." Moreover, unless this 
question is determined, if the plaintiff is right in his 
contentions, he would be deprived of his right to vote 
at the coming election. Furthermore, this is a civil rights 
case. \Ve are of the opinion that, under the more recent 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the 
duty and right of the Federal courts to protect the cit-
izen in the assertion of his civil rights is clearly indicated. 
Ordinarily, a Federal court does not, in a case where it 
had jurisdiction, step aside because a question of state 
la\v is involved at the threshold of the determination of 
the case. The exceptional cases where the court does 
that are as pointed out by the late Chief Justice Stone 
in :Meridith v. Winter IIaven, and of course in that cat-
egory of exceptions are the constitutional question cases. 
But there is no indication now that .a speedy decision can 
be had in the courts of New l\1:exico. And it is obvious 
to us, unless we decide this question, this plaintiff and 
others similarly situated will be deprived of the right 
to vote at the coming national election. 
Of course, we are determining this case on the status 
of the present civil rights as set forth in the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution, 
and in the statutes enacted complementary thereto. 
Now, with respect to deciding this constitutional 
question, perhaps this further observation should be 
made. As we view the provision of the New Mexico Con-
stitution, it is immaterial whether or not from a con-
stitutional standpoint "Indians not taxed" means Indians 
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who do not pay ad valorem tax or means Indians who 
do not pay state taxes of any character. It might be 
true-and I think we must admit-that if the state 
Supreme Court should ultimately hold that the payment 
of a tax on one purchase of gasoline or on one suck of 
flour would qualify the Indian to vote, that the consti-
tutional question so far as this plaintiff is concerned 
would disappear. But the practical situation is that the 
statute is being construed otherwise, and this Indian is 
being deprived of the right to vote, if he has the right 
to vote, by the limited construction. So,- we think we 
should decide the question of the constitutionality of 
the provision in the New Mexico Constitution. It says 
that "Indians not taxed" niay not vote, although they 
possess every other qualification. We are unable to 
escape the conclusion that, under the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments, that constitutes a discrimination 
on the ground of race. Any other citizen, regardless of 
race, in the Sta,te of New Mexico who has not paid one 
cent of t~ax of any kind or character, if he possesses the 
other qualifications, may vote. An Indian, and only 
an Indian, in order to n1eet the qualifications of a voter, 
must have paid a tax. How you can escape the conclusion 
that that makes a requirement with respect to an Indian 
as a qualification to exercise the elective franchise ,and 
does not make that require1nent \Yith respect to the mem-
ber of any other rare is beyond n1e. I just feel like the 
conclusion is inescapable. 
Now, the suggestion \Yas made that they really 
don't n1ean Indians not taxed, but they 111e.an Indians 
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that live in pueblos in tribal relationships, and who are 
favored by the Federal requirements that their land and 
personal property is free from taxation by the State. 
The fact remains that the constitutional p:vovisions say 
that each citizen who possesse'S these other qualifications 
may vote unless he is an Indian. If he is an· Indian, it 
says he may not vote if he has not paid a tax. We don't 
think the distinction which the able argument of the 
Assistant District Attorney has presented does justify 
us in concluding that this is not a discrimination on the 
ground of race. 
It, perhaps, is not entirely pe-rtinent to the issue, 
but we know how these New 1Iexico pueblo Indians and 
non-pueblo Indians in the state have re'Sponded to the 
need of the country in time of war in a patriotic whole-
hearted way, both in furnishing manpower in the military 
forces and in the purchase of war bonds and patriotic 
contributions of that character. We know that the other 
states who have had similar requirements-Utah, one 
of the Dakotas, I am not sure about Colorado, I know 
it has such a requirement--most of the other states, if 
not all, who have this requirement have ·administratively 
dete-rmined that it was a requirement which could not 
constitutionally be imposed by the state. While such 
rulings are not controlling, they, perhaps, are entitled 
to consideration. 
Why should an Indian, who answers his country's 
call like these Indians have, be deprived of the right to 
vote beeause he appears to be favored by a requirement 
of the National Government~ That' is, certain property 
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shall be exeinpted from taxation. I don't know whether it 
is still on the statute books, but when I was in the Legis-
lruture, back in 1921, we passed a statute giving an ex-
serviceman an exemption of two thousand dollars from 
taxation. There was a special class that enjoyed a par-
ticular tax exemption. Would it have been constitutional 
for New Mexico to have then said this class that enjoys 
the two thousand dollar tax exemption shall not be per-
mitted to vote~ And especially if they had said they 
may not vote if they are Swedes or Norwegians or Ger-
mans. I just don't think, and my brothers agree with me, 
that this constitutional provision can be sustained in the 
face of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and 
we so conclude. 
Perhaps Judge S.avage and Judge Broaddus would 
like to amplify what I have said. 
JUDGE BROADDUS: I have nothing. 
JUDGE SAVAGE: You have very well stated my 
views, Judge Phillips. I might add this. There has never 
been any question in Iny mind as to the unconstitution-
ality of the constitutional provision. I have been troubled 
by the cases to which Judge Phillips referred indicating 
that under certain circu1nstances the Federal court should 
stand by and ·wait for an authoritative construction of 
the state statute or state constitutional provision. But 
I am convinced that the Federal court should not stand 
by and await the outc01ne of .an action to be instituted in 
the state court when the practical result would necessar-
ily be to deprive a eertain class of citizens of their con-
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stitutional right to vote at the next election. Certainly, 
that would be the practical result here should we defer 
decision in this case until an action could be commenced 
and prosecuted through the state courts of New Mexico. 
JUDGE BROADDUS: Of course, the Court is in 
hannony in interpreting these statutes; the civil rights 
statutes, and Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 
with the natural rights of men and their civil rights and 
responsibilities. The thought occurs to me, as we have 
discussed and as you may properly direct to the attention 
of counsel, that this matter may be disposed of as a 
final matter. 
JUDGE PHILLIPS: Perhaps I should have stated 
this Court's jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C.A. 
Section 21, subdivision 1, and subdivision 12 and sub-
division 14. Now, having indicated our views, it would 
seem that every relevant issue of fact and law is pre-
sented. There seems to be no good reason why it 
shouldn't be agreed by counsel that the Court enter a 
final judgment at this time on the Complaint, and the 
facts as reflected in the stipulation. I don't see how 
there can be any additional facts pertinent, .and what 
we have said disposes of the real merits of the contro-
versy. Another important reason for that is this: That 
the state could immediately appeal to the Supreme Court 
of the United States. Of course, you could appeal fron1 
the order granting an interlocutory injunction. But, 
if we made a final disposition and entered a final order, 
you could appeal front that and the Supreme Court 
could then, if it was so minded, advance the case .and hear 
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it on the lOth of October, which would be the second 
Monday, tenth or eleventh, I am not sure which, the time 
when the Court usually begins to hear cases. They meet 
on the first l\Ionday and I think start hearings on the 
second Monday. There would . be a strong possibility 
that you could get a final decision by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in October so that you would know 
when the election came whether to permit these people 
to vote or not. Of course, you would have to register 
them in the meantime. But whether or not you would 
count their votes could, I should think, possibly be de-
termined by the election in K oven1ber. That is the speed-
iest way to get a de,tennination of this question that I 
can see. 
Is there any objection to a final determination? 
MR. FEDERICI: No objection on the part of the 
State. I think that is a good suggestion and we will con-
cur in it. We want a speedy determination. 
JUDGE PHILLIPS: Let counsel add to the stipu-
lation they have already n1ade that this is sub1nitted for 
a final and permanent injunction, and the Court will 
enter a declaratory judgment that that portion of the 
New Mexico Constitutional provision ··Indians not taxed" 
contravenes the ~.,ourteenth and Fifteenth Alnendments 
and is void, and will enjoin the County Clerk of Y alencia 
County from refusing to register the plaintiff as a qual-
ified voter, and frmn refusing to register the other In-
di,ans ~imilarly situated in his county who are qualified 
voters other than the f.act that they have not paid the 
taxes. 
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